PHIL_2501_Test_2_-_Sample_Questions

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Carleton University *

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2501

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Philosophy

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Feb 20, 2024

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1. What theoretical advantages does philosophical behaviourism offer over dualism? What are some problems with the view? Advantages of Philosophical Behaviourism over Dualism : Philosophical behaviourism offers several advantages in the realm of understanding the mind. Firstly, it simplifies the model for comprehending the mind by focusing on observable behaviours, avoiding the need to introduce non-physical entities like the mind or soul, as dualism does. This simplicity is appealing as it prevents the postulation of separate realms of reality for the mental and the physical. Additionally, behaviourism aligns well with an empirical and scientific approach, emphasising the importance of observable and measurable aspects of behaviour, which makes it more amenable to scientific investigation compared to dualism. A significant advantage of philosophical behaviourism is its ability to avoid the "interaction problem" that dualism faces, as it avoids the need to explain the interaction between the non-physical mind and the physical body by concentrating on observable behaviours and their determinants. Problems with Philosophical Behaviourism: Philosophical behaviourism faces several issues. Firstly, it has an exclusive focus on external, observable behaviours, which leads to the neglect of internal mental states like thoughts, emotions, and conscious experiences. These inner aspects of the mind are essential for comprehending the richness of human mental life, but behaviourism falls short in effectively explaining or describing them. Additionally, while behaviourism offers valuable insights into certain aspects of mental functioning, it lacks the capacity to offer a comprehensive explanation of all mental phenomena. It struggles to fully explain the complexity and depth of human mental experiences, especially those that cannot be directly observed through external behaviours. Furthermore, behaviourism often disregards critical internal cognitive processes occurring within the mind, such as reasoning, problem-solving, memory, and perception, which play a significant role in our understanding of the mind and are not adequately addressed by this perspective. 2. What theoretical advantages does identity theory possess over philosophical behaviourism? What is a problem for the view? Identity theory and philosophical behaviourism are two different approaches to understanding the relationship between mental states and physical states. It excels in offering causal explanations for the relationship between mental states and behaviour, providing a direct link between specific mental states and their corresponding brain states. This enables a clear understanding of how mental states can cause behaviour, a feature that Behaviorism often struggles with. Moreover, Identity Theory supports the notion of "mental causation," allowing our thoughts and feelings to genuinely influence our behaviour, while Behaviorism may have difficulty explaining the causal efficacy of mental states. Identity Theory also accommodates the existence of unobservable mental occurrences, such as thoughts and emotions, which may not always manifest as observable behaviour. Unlike Behaviorism, Identity Theory is primarily concerned with the physical basis of mental states and their relation to behaviour, rather than analysing word meanings. Identity Theory faces several challenges, including "species chauvinism," where it struggles to explain how different creatures or systems can share identical mental states despite varying brain structures. The "explanatory gap" poses difficulties in bridging the divide between physical brain descriptions and the subjective, qualitative nature of mental states. The "problem of multiple realizability"
questions its ability to account for the same mental state being realised by diverse brain configurations. Additionally, there's a need to clarify whether Identity Theory supports token or type identity, and it grapples with the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity. Lastly, its contingent identity claims raise concerns about the stability and reliability of such claims. 3. In what ways does functionalism offer "the best of both worlds" in comparison to philosophical behaviourism and identity theory? Functionalism offers a balanced perspective that bridges the strengths of philosophical behaviourism and identity theory. Like behaviourism, it values observable behaviours and internal cognitive processes in understanding the mind, giving a more comprehensive view of mental phenomena. While identity theory says one mental state matches one physical state, functionalism says one mental state can show up in various physical ways, which helps understand the many facets of the human mind. Furthermore, functionalism is comprehensive, examining both the functional roles and behavioural aspects of mental states, along with their underlying physical processes. Taking this comprehensive approach is especially helpful in grasping the complexities of how our minds work and addresses the challenge of multiple realizability. In simple terms, functionalism finds a middle ground between behaviourism, which focuses on what we can see, and identity theory, which sticks to strict physical connections. This makes it a versatile and all-encompassing way to study the mind. 4. How does functionalism propose to analyse mental states? Explain in precise terms the two main objections to functionalism we discussed in class: (i) Fodor's problem of qualitative content, and (ii) Block's homunculi-headed robots. Functionalism analyses mental states by focusing on their roles and function in the mind. However, there are two main objections discussed in class: (i) Fodor's Problem of Qualitative Content: Fodor's objection revolves around the issue of qualitative content in conscious experiences. Functionalism emphasises the functional role of mental states, which means it focuses on how mental states interact with each other and with external stimuli to produce behaviour. However, Fodor points out that functional descriptions alone may not capture the subjective and qualitative aspects of mental experiences, often referred to as "qualia." Qualia are the unique, personal qualities of our experiences, such as the specific sensation of tasting chocolate or the ineffable beauty of a sunset. Functionalism struggles to account for the rich and subjective nature of these qualitative experiences. This objection highlights a potential gap in functionalism's ability to fully explain what it's like to have particular mental states and why some mental states feel the way they do. (ii) Block's Homunculi-Headed Robots: Block's objection challenges functionalism by presenting scenarios where systems meet the criteria for having mental states according to functional analysis but may not truly possess consciousness. The classic example is the "homunculi-headed robot" thought experiment. Imagine a robot with tiny humanoid figures or "homunculi" inside its head, each performing specific tasks that collectively mimic mental processes. While this system might exhibit
the functional organisation associated with mental states, it's unclear whether the homunculi themselves are conscious or if the robot as a whole genuinely possesses consciousness. Block's argument highlights a potential issue with functionalism's attribution of mental states. It raises concerns about whether functional organisation alone is sufficient for genuine consciousness, or if there might be a need for some form of internal subjective experience. This objection challenges the reliability of functionalism in determining which systems are truly conscious and which are not, as it raises questions about the nature of consciousness and the potential for "hidden observers" within functional systems. 5. Explain Smart’s identity theory (including what specific type of identity he takes to be centrally involved). What is his response to Objections 1 and 3? (Be sure to also explain the objections.) Smart's Identity Theory claims that each mental state corresponds to a specific pattern of neural activity in the brain. In other words, mental states are identical to particular physical states in the brain. Smart's theory focuses on "contingent identity," which means that it can be empirically verified through observation and scientific investigation. This view is a type of physicalism, as it claims that mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to physical processes. Objection 1: This objection raises the concern that if we don't fully understand the inner workings of the brain, how can we confidently claim that mental states are identical to specific brain processes? It suggests that our ability to talk about sensations may not necessarily mean we are referring to underlying brain processes. Smart’s Reply to Objection 1: Smart argues that the lack of complete understanding of the brain's inner workings doesn't undermine the theory's validity. He maintains that even if we discuss sensations without comprehensive knowledge of brain processes, it doesn't necessarily mean that sensations and brain processes are entirely different things. The identity theory proposes that as our understanding of the brain advances, we will discover specific neural states that correspond to each mental state. Objection 3: This objection questions whether mental sensations have unique, indivisible qualities that cannot be reduced to physical brain processes. It suggests that there might be subjective, qualitative aspects of consciousness that are not accounted for by the theory. Smart’s Reply to Objection 3: Smart's response to this objection involves using "topic-neutral" language. He suggests that when discussing sensations, we should use language that doesn't involve clear mentions to consciousness or subjective experiences. By doing so, he aims to avoid asserting that sensations possess unique mental properties that are separate from brain processes. Smart's approach involves redefining and rephrasing our descriptions of mental states, focusing on the observable and objective aspects of those states, which can be more readily connected to neural processes. This way, he maintains that we can bridge the gap between subjective experiences and physical brain states, ultimately supporting his identity theory.
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